Desfazendo o próprio passado by de Medeiros, Eduardo Vicentini
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC 
BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited.
DOSSIER
Filosofia Unisinos 
Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
19(1):97-102, jan/apr 2018
Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2018.191.11
ABSTRACT 
In contemporary research on memory, the idea of mental time travel (MTT) has been con-
nected, at the functional level, with planning and imagining what might occur in one’s fu-
ture. Episodic memory impacts on our capacity to move imaginatively towards possible 
scenarios ahead. Consequently, Gerrans and Kennett (2010, 2016) urge us to agree that 
MTT is essential to moral agency. In this paper, we suggest that if we conceive the specific 
varieties of MTT as something more than remembering one’s past and imagining one’s fu-
ture, then the capacity of undoing one’s past both by episodic counterfactual thinking and 
the emotion of regret must be considered essential to moral agency on equal terms.
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RESUMO 
Na pesquisa contemporânea sobre memória, a ideia de viagem mental no tempo (MTT, em 
inglês) tem sido conectada, no nível funcional, com o planejamento e a imaginação do que 
pode ocorrer no próprio futuro. A memória episódica impacta a nossa capacidade de nos 
movermos imaginativamente em direção a possíveis cenários à frente. Consequentemente, 
Gerrans e Kennett (2010, 2016) nos levam a concordar que a MTT é essencial para a agência 
moral. Neste trabalho, sugerimos que, se concebermos as variedades específicas de MTT 
como algo mais do que lembrar o próprio passado e imaginar o próprio futuro, então a 
capacidade de desfazer o próprio passado, tanto pelo pensamento episódico contrafactual 
quanto pela emoção do arrependimento, deve ser, de igual forma, considerada essencial 
para a agência moral.
Palavras-chave: agência moral, viagem mental no tempo, pensamento contrafactual episó-
dico, arrependimento.
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Undoing one’s past
Desfazendo o próprio passado
Eduardo Vicentini de Medeiros1
Introduction 
In “Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency” Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett endorse 
the crucial role that imagination and memory play for capable moral agents. They oppose the so-
called “neurosentimentalism”, namely, a kind of metaethical sentimentalism built upon empirical 
evidence, available in studies with neurological patients impaired by significant damages to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), patients who are compromised both at the level of the 
tacit affective processes and of moral agency. These are the affective processes which, therefore, 
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according to advocates of neurosentimentalism, such as Josh-
ua Greene, Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Prinz, the competence 
in moral judging crucially depends on. 
As most of you surely know, in the footsteps of the 
groundbreaking results by Antonio Damasio and Antoine 
Bechara, there is a lot of discussion, both in neurosciences and 
moral psychology, on the correct interpretation of the exper-
imental data exploring the capacities for moral judging and 
decision-making in vmPFC patients.
For our current goals, it would be less demanding to 
discuss the big picture of the theoretical dispute against neu-
rosentimentalism than to point out the problematic disso-
ciation between moral agency and moral judgement in the 
neurosentimentalistic camp, a dissociation sugge ed by the 
idea that it is only possible to make moral judgements either 
by the application of a rule or by automatically responding to 
tacit affective processes, without the need, in both cases, to 
mentally project ourselves into fitting future scenarios.
The moral agency could be exemplified by the capaci-
ties to plan and make decisions, to commit ourselves to the 
attitudes of evaluating ends and means, to act in accordance 
with what we are valuing, to respond to moral demands and 
to justify chosen courses of a ion after deliberation. 
Kennett and Gerrans offers a fruitful hypothesis to ex-
plain why we must avoid dissociating moral judgement and 
agency, or, in their words: “A moral agent needs to be able to 
conceive herself as a temporal extended entity as a necessary 
condition for moral reflection and decision-making” (Gerrans 
and Kennett, 2010, p. 588).
With the hypothesis in plain view, we can move on to 
introduce the leading motivation behind it: Mental time 
travel (MTT) is essential to moral agency because episodic 
memory and imagination are tools to conceive ourselves as 
temporally extended entities. Furthermore, to reinforce the 
point about agential competence we must add another com-
ponent of Gerrans and Kennett’s strategy. The MTT capaci-
ties to imagine future scenarios and recover past ones are un-
der voluntary control: “It is this voluntary, executive, a ect 
of mental time travel which is so important for the capacity 
for planning, and which makes executive a ion dependent 
on maturation of the frontal systems” (Gerrans and Kennett, 
2010, p. 599). 
Neurotypical subjects voluntarily build upon recollect-
ed and constructed past scenarios to decide what to do ahead 
via simulations of possibilities into the future.  
The connections between the capacity for moral agency 
and MTT could be highlighted in the commitments we as-
sume after short or long-term planning: 
We exercise the capacity for mental time 
travel whenever we revise for this year a 
class we gave last year—remembering what 
worked and what didn’t—whenever we re-
flect on what kind of career or job would 
best suit us, whenever we plan a holiday or a 
shopping trip, arrange a meeting, organize 
a party, or commit ourselves to a course of 
study, an exercise program, or a marriage 
(Gerrans and Kennett, 2010, p. 601). 
Around six years after the first paper on the subject, the 
authors re arted the discussion in Mental Time Travel, Dy-
namic Evaluation, and Moral Agency in a slightly different fo-
cus, rea ing to a critique by Zarpentine (2017) on the correct 
interpretation of experimental data about vmPFC patients’ 
capacities for diachronic agency, or, in Zarpentine’s concep-
tion, dynamic evaluation. One of the positive results from the 
discussion was to clarify the following point of Gerrans and 
Kennett’s strategy: “[...] what matters for diachronic agency/
dynamic evaluation is the ability to feel the future. Indeed our 
main point was to argue that if people lose this ability they 
have less of a self to project and hence are compromised as 
agents” (Gerrans and Kennett, 2016, p. 5).
Taking stock of Gerrans and Kennett’s position on the 
topic give us at least two questions for the next sections: (1) 
For what reasons research on episodic memory, along the 
lines of the MTT quasi-paradigm2, did the unexpected move 
from focusing on remembering the past to mainly discussing 
the anticipation of future scenarios? (2) If the “ability to feel 
the future” is a functional presupposition to moral agency, 
why not argue for another phenomenological component of 
well-functioning moral agency as being the ability to feel the 
undoing of one’s past?       
Mental time travel and one’s 
future scenarios 
When you write a paper for a dossier, it is possible to 
presuppose some of the information already given by the 
previous participants. I am not able to describe the reception 
of the mental time view of memory more accurately than 
André Sant’Anna, e ecially in section 2 of his contribution 
in the present issue – Mental time travel and the philosophy 
of memory – but I would need to recollect two of the points 
rightly highlighted by him. 
The first one is about the phenomenological a ects of 
“autonoesis” as described by Tulving: “[t]he act of remember-
ing [...] is chara erized by a distinctive, unique awareness of 
reexperiencing here and now something that happened be-
fore, at another time and in another place” (Tulving, 1993, 
p. 68). The “what-it-is-likeness” of reexperiencing or antici-
pating autobiographical events gives us the capacity to travel 
in subjective time, and the conceptual derivations from Tulv-
2 The prefix “quasi” appears as a reminder that the cognitive science of memory based on MTT has not acquired yet the Kuhnian status 
of normal science.
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ing’s autonoesis allow phrases like “feel the future” or “feel the 
past” when we talk about the MTT varieties.  
The second point directs us to the first question made at 
the end of the introduction and refers to MTT operations as 
tools to imagine one’s future scenarios rather than just recol-
lect or re-experience the past. 
One of the most innovative results of the widespread 
acceptance of the MTT framework in memory research has 
been a re-conceptualization of episodic memory, through 
its functional role in future-oriented planning and deci-
sion-making. Rather than just recollect the past, episodic 
memory helps to project one’s future, working side by side, as 
we argue, with the capacity for undoing one’s past. 
Daniel Scha er above all, championed the idea of a pro-
 ective brain, whose main functional task would be to antic-
ipate future scenarios. The impact of this view is highlighted 
in the editor’s introduction to a new collection of essays on 
the topic edited by Michaelian et al. (2016, p. 1): “[...] recog-
nition has grown that mental time travel into the past cannot 
be understood independently of future-oriented mental time 
travel (FMTT) [...]; indeed, FMTT may be primary, with our 
capacity to remember the past being derivative of the more 
basic capacity to imagine the future [...].” 
In the footsteps of Scha er, a very similar point was 
rightly made in De Brigard (2013, p. 159): 
I argue that seeing memory as a cognitive 
system for remembering the past may not 
be the best way of making sense of its func-
tion. Instead, I offer a picture of memory 
as an integral part of a larger system that 
supports not only thinking of what was the 
case and what potentially could be the case, 
but also what could have been the case. 
More precisely, building upon the work 
of Schacter and colleagues (e.g., Schacter 
2001; Schacter and Addis 2007), I claim that 
remembering is a particular operation of a 
cognitive system that permits the flexible 
recombination of different components of 
encoded traces into representations of pos-
sible past events that might or might not 
have occurred, presumably in the service of 
constructing mental simulations of possible 
future events.
In addition to De Brigard’s and Scha er’s views, the very 
same general position has been proposed by Klein for the last 
sixteen years or so (e.g. Klein et al., 2002; Klein et al., 2010, 
2011; Klein, 2013, 2016), exploring the biological pressures 
on evolving episodic memory capacities: “[...] memory, as de-
signed by natural selection, is not simply be capable of imagin-
ing the future; rather imagining the future is its evolved func-
tion, its raison d’être” (Klein, 2013, p. 233). 
The main reason for the interdependence of (1) epi-
sodic future thinking, (2) episodic memory and (3) episodic 
counterfactual thinking is what we may call the “same brain 
area assumption”, namely, the widespread acceptance of the 
neuroimaging evidence for the overlapping a ivation of 
the same brain areas in these three  ecific MTT processes. 
The following quotes are bona fide examples of the “same 
brain area assumption”:  
[...] it seems safe to conclude that episod-
ic future thinking and episodic counter-
factual thinking both engage regions that 
are also recruited when people remember 
specific past experiences from their every-
day lives. On a general level, the overlap of 
this core-network with the default network 
is consistent with theoretical perspectives 
that have emphasized the role of this net-
work in supporting various kinds of mental 
simulations (Schacter et al., 2014, p. 16).
      
It is a reasonable assumption that coun-
terfactuals share many cognitive and neu-
rological processes with past and future 
memory. To construct a counterfactual, key 
elements from past experiences need to be 
remembered (like episodic past thinking) 
and, crucially, some elements need to be re-
combined so that a novel imagined scenar-
io can be constructed (like episodic future 
thinking). An abundance of neurological 
studies during the last decade have demon-
strated that episodic past and future think-
ing share several areas in the brain. Addis 
et al. (2009; Schacter and Addis, 2007) 
proposed a core memory brain network 
engaged during remembering and imag-
ing of past and future events that includes 
the hippocampus, posterior cingulate/ret-
rosplenial midline, inferior parietal lobule, 
lateral temporal cortices and the medial 
prefrontal cortex (Van Hoeck et al., 2013, 
p. 556, emphasis added).
In view of the structural similarities, at the level of the 
physical realization of the three main MTT processes in the 
brain, it seems defendable to assume their functional coor-
dination, hypothesizing the adaptive value of episodic future 
thinking as the chief target of the entire MTT cognitive sys-
tem. This hypothesis is at the core of the MTT quasi-par-
adigm and leaves an open door to explore the connections 
between moral agency in particular, agency in general, and 
the MTT processes. All things considered, it seems equally 
defendable that, as moral agents “[...] we predominantly stand 
in the present facing the future rather than looking back at 
the past” (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, p. 147).
This hypothesis has some theoretical benefits as well, for 
example, it helps to come to grips with the peculiar perva-
siveness of misremembering in our daily lives, the forthright 
discussion in De Brigard (2013) as tries to demonstrate. 
The same general hypothesis has been expanded in an-
other fruitful direction by Hoerl and McCormack (2016), 
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discussing both the role of the counterfactual emotion of 
regret and the evolutionary function of episodic memory 
in future-oriented decision-making. In their words: “Our 
argument will be that episodic memory, because of its back-
ward-looking element, underpins the ability to experience 
regret, and that this is an important way in which episodic 
memory impacts on and supports adaptive future-oriented 
decision making” (2016, p. 242). 
To examine this argumentative strategy in general and 
in Hoerl and McCormack’s piece will automatically demand 
from us an answer to the second question made in the intro-
duction, on the ability to feel the undoing of one’s past as a 
necessary component of the well-functioning moral agency. 
That will be the task for the next section, but by now we need 
to increase the understanding of the multiple ways a compe-
tent moral agent faces the future.         
One recently proposed taxonomy for future-oriented 
mental time travel capacities helps to disclose the moral agen-
cy dynamics, at least in one of the directions in which we con-
ceive ourselves as “temporal extended” entities. According to 
Szpunar et al. (2016), we can classify future-oriented mental 
time travel, or pro ection, in four basic modes: 
simulation (construction of a detailed men-
tal representation of the future); prediction 
(estimation of the likelihood of, and/ or 
one’s reaction to, a particular future out-
come); intention (the mental act of setting 
a goal); and planning (the identification and 
organization of steps toward achieving a 
goal state) (Szprunar et al., 2016, p. 21).
The four operative modes equally draw on semantic and 
episodic memory contents. We will refrain from discussing the 
semantic forms of FMTT keeping an eye on the episodic forms 
only. We choose that way on phenomenological grounds, hence 
in the episodic FMTT “the subject has a pre-reflective sense 
that he is “pre-living” a possible future” (Michaelian et al., 2016, 
p. 6). In our view, that is another  ecial feature of moral agency 
to be added in a comprehensive theory.
For the episodic contents, simulation is the “construction 
of a mental representation of a  ecific autobiographical fu-
ture event”, prediction is the “estimation of the likelihood of 
[...] one’s rea ion to a  ecific autobiographical future event”, 
intention works “setting a goal in relation to a  ecific autobi-
ographical future event”, and for planning we have the demand 
for “organization of steps needed to arrive at a  ecific autobi-
ographical future event” (Szprunar et al., 2016, p. 22).
For the sake of the argumentative strategy developed in 
the next section, we need to presuppose the correctness and 
explicative power of this taxonomy. Understanding the phe-
nomenological a ects of the four episodic modes of pro ec-
tion is crucial to what will follow. As we will see in the next 
section, the “what-is-it-likeness” of FMTT and its functional 
connections with moral agency will be partially replicated for 
the counterfactual episodic thinking. 
In order to feel the temporal extension of the self into 
the future, we need to feel the simulation, prediction, intention 
and planning, working upon episodic contents. In order to 
feel the undoing of one’s past, we need to pay attention to the 
phenomenological dimensions of the counterfactual episodic 
simulation or the construction of a mental representation of 
an autobiographical counterfactual event, and counterfactual 
episodic prediction or the estimation of the likelihood of one’s 
rea ion to an autobiographical counterfactual event.    
Episodic counterfactual thinking, 
regret and moral agency
In both fictional literature and science, the question as 
to what episodic counterfactual thinking is for has been asked 
now and then, keeping up with skeptical worries, sometimes 
with genuine curiosity, sometimes only nurturing pure per-
plexity. It is not exactly an easy task to formulate an expla-
nation for the evolutionary pressure to think about what you 
and me could have done or chosen differently. Everybody 
knows what must be the meaning conveyed by common say-
ings like “don’t cry over spilled milk”, “what’s done is done”, or, 
a little more figuratively, the proper rhetorical push of phrases 
like “to rake over old coals”. All these phrases and sayings point 
to the same old and venerated metaphysical view on the im-
mutability of past events.  
Nevertheless, it is plausible to find a convergence of 
opinions on a usual su ect for that skepticism or perplexi-
ty: the emotion of regret. In view of the immutability of the 
things already done, what could be a function for the counter-
factual emotion of regret? 
Let’s re-start e ablishing a meaning for the word: “Re-
gret [...] is by definition an emotion directed toward the past: 
one regrets a choice one has made, typically believing that if 
one had chosen differently a better outcome would have ob-
tained” (Hoerl and McCormack, 2016, p. 241-242). There-
fore, regret is a counterfactual emotion, to be more  ecific, 
an emotion functionally dependent on the occurrence of 
an upward counterfactual conditional thought. The undo-
ing of a ects of one’s past—the “if I had chosen differently” 
antecedent part—is followed by the simulation of a possible 
upward consequence— the “a better outcome would have ob-
tained” consequent part. 
 In the psychological literature, it is not difficult to find 
authors hypothesizing functions for the emotion of regret in 
decision-making processes, planning, or in motivation and 
control of future behavior (see Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2007). 
Neal Roese probably has been one of the main advocates of a 
functional theory of counterfactual thinking in general and 
counterfactual emotions, like regret, in particular. Back in 
the early nineties, he wrote: “[...] people may strategically use 
[...] upward and additive counterfactuals to improve perfor-
mances in the future (a preparative function)” (Roese, 1993, 
p. 806). In his last book on the subject, using a more popular 
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tone, we also read: “Regret feels bad, but it is utterly essential 
for healthy living. Understanding and harnessing our own 
regrets can make you better. [...] Regret is an example of a 
negative emotion that spurs people to problem-solving and 
personal betterment” (Roese, 2005, p. 2).       
Hoerl and McCormack (2016, p. 245), as already men-
tioned, argue in a more straightforward fashion, using the 
emotion of regret as a link between decision-making about 
the future and episodic memory. Their argument offers a 
simple explanation of the role played by episodic memory in 
thinking and deciding about the future, through the following 
schematic steps:
(1)  “the emotion of regret plays a crucial role in fu-
ture-oriented decision-making”;
(2)  “one can only regret what is in the past”;
(3)  regret “requires a type of mental simulation that is 
itself intrinsically bound up with a capacity to recol-
lect one’s past”;
(4)  therefore, the capacity to recollect one’s past (epi-
sodic memory) “plays a crucial role in future-orient-
ed decision-making” (Hoerl and McCormack, 2016, 
p. 245).
Trying to support the premise (1), Hoerl and McCor-
mack (2016, p. 246) say, endorsing Zeelenberg and Pieters 
(2007): 
One way to argue for a close relation be-
tween regret and future-oriented decision 
making might be to point to its close rela-
tion with agency and personal responsibil-
ity: indeed, Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) 
argue that regret is the only negative emo-
tion that has a special relation with one’s 
own choices, such that it is only experi-
enced if one believes one has made a poor 
or suboptimal choice. However, for present 
purposes we want to focus on the temporal 
character of regret. Zeelenberg and Pieters 
(2007, p. 8) capture this character in their 
claim that “[r]egret bridges the past and the 
future in the present.” What they mean by 
this is that although regret is experienced 
in the present, it is always past-directed; at 
the same time, although regret is directed 
toward our past, it has the capacity to exert 
a strong influence on our future (Hoerl and 
McCormack, 2016, p. 246).
To meet our present needs it is sufficient to propose the 
emotion of regret as the main phenomenological component 
of the undoing of one’s past; therefore, it is equally sufficient 
to propose that the capacity for regret is essential to moral 
agency, e ecially because of the temporal scope of it, crossing 
past, present and future directions. 
The emotion of regret, additionally, shares at least two 
a ects with the commonsensical attribution of responsibil-
ity: we do not feel regret or are held responsible for (a) what 
could not have been done otherwise, and (b) for what has not 
been done by ourselves. We do not regret the incapacity to fly 
without some apparatus, as we are not responsible for that. 
We do not regret other people’s choices, as we are not, in most 
cases, responsible for them.
Recovering the previous discussion on the dynamics of 
moral agency, we finally propose the general capacity for epi-
sodic counterfactual thinking as one of the tools we must use 
to properly conceive ourselves as temporal extended entities. 
Considering the taxonomy of four basic modes of FMTT or 
pro ection, we think it is sound to argue for the functional 
role of two counterpart mental processes, namely, (1’) coun-
terfactual episodic simulation, or the construction of a mental 
representation of an autobiographical counterfactual event, 
and (2’) counterfactual episodic prediction, or the estimation of 
the likelihood of one’s rea ion to an autobiographical coun-
terfactual event.3 It is not difficult to perceive that the a i-
vation of regret, for example, depends on both (1’) and (2’).
The temporal extension of the moral selves, in the di-
rection of episodic counterfactual scenarios, adds a modal 
dimension to moral agency. It is not enough to travel back 
and forth in the subjective time to have a complete picture of 
moral agency. The well-documented contribution of regret in 
decision-making processes shows that we must take seriously 
the capacity of undoing one’s past as an essential a ect of ca-
pable moral agency.
Additionally, we must recognize that the “same brain 
area argument” equally works here to integrate the emotion 
of regret, decision-making, episodic future thinking and ep-
isodic memory.   
In a paper by Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde one can find a 
fine example of this: 
The integration of regret in decision theo-
ry has been supported by recent neurobi-
ological investigation. Present studies on 
the neural correlates of regret take advan-
tage of previous observations on the role 
of the orbitofrontal cortex in the process-
ing of reward and its role on subsequent 
behaviour. Rolls (2000) has evidenced the 
incapacity of orbitofrontal patients to mod-
ify their behaviour in response to negative 
consequences. Ursu and Carter (2005) have 
demonstrated how the anticipated affective 
impact of a choice was modulated by the 
comparison between the different available 
alternatives. These reasoning patterns, con-
3 It is not exactly clear to me whether it is sound to think of the other two counterfactual parts of FMTT, namely, counterfactual intention 
and counterfactual planning.
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sisting of anticipating contrasts between 
actual outcomes and counterfactual ones 
(counterfactual in the sense that those out-
comes are the ones that I would have got 
had I taken an alternative course of action), 
are reflected in the orbitofrontal cortex ac-
tivity. More precisely, the impact of poten-
tially negative consequences of choices is 
essentially represented in the lateral areas 
of the orbitofrontal cortex, whereas the 
medial and dorsal areas of the prefrontal 
cortex are more specialized in the impact of 
positive consequences (Bourgeois-Gironde, 
2010, p. 250). 
Final remarks 
I think it is fair enough to claim that the idea of mental 
time travel has e ablished a solid beachhead in moral psychol-
ogy, bringing effects for metaethics. And that this is great news 
for the re ective fields. After Gerrans and Kennett (2010, 
2016) we have very good reasons to nourish second thoughts 
about the theoretical possibility of only making moral judg-
ments either by the application of a rule or by automatically re-
sponding to tacit affective processes. The full capacity for moral 
agency create a demand to mentally project ourselves into fu-
ture and past scenarios. And, we would like to add, to mentally 
project ourselves into counterfactual episodic scenarios. The 
functionality of the emotion of regret in decision-making is 
only the most pervasive evidence for an expected counterfac-
tual dimension of the temporal extended moral self.
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